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It is our hope that the lessons learned in Fer-
guson will provide guidance to . . . police de-
partments around the country and will prepare 
these agencies to respond effectively and consti-
tutionally to the challenges of mass demonstra-
tions in the 21st century. [emphasis added]
— Institute for Intergovernmental  
Research 2015
Changes in the Policing of Civil 
Disorders Since the Kerner 
Report: The Police Response to 
Ferguson, August 2014, and 
Some Implications for the 
Twenty- First Century
patrIck f.  GIllh a m a nd Gary t.  m ar x
The Kerner Commission identified factors contributing to police ineffectiveness during the 1960s civil disor-
ders. Since release of the Kerner report, the frequency and intensity of civil disorders has declined and the 
policing of disorders has changed. Using the report recommendations as a framework, we analyze changes 
in police disorder management during the 2014 events in Ferguson as these involve operational planning 
and equipment. Data for the Ferguson case are constructed from media reports, police and activist accounts, 
after action reports, and field observations. We link changes seen in Ferguson to larger institutional changes 
in law enforcement over the last fifty years. We conclude with discussions on what did and did not work in 
the policing of Ferguson and highlight implications for policing of protest and disorder in the twenty- first 
century.
Keywords: Kerner Commission, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, democratic policing, 
protest, riots, Ferguson
t h e  p o l I c I n G  o f  c I v I l  d I s o r d e r s
Police departments have become more adept 
at handling potential riot situations. While 
riot potentials were greater in 1968 than in 
1967, the triggering events were rapidly con-
trolled and large- scale disorders thus were 
avoided.
—Urban America 1969
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Police were a central factor in the 1967 disor-
ders studied by the National Advisory Commis-
sion on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commis-
sion, thus the Kerner report [1968]). The 
commission’s “Supplement on Control of Dis-
order” considered problems related to opera-
tional planning, logistical needs, training, con-
trol equipment, coordination, and legal needs. 
We use some of their 1968 recommendations 
as the framework to contrast police behavior 
then and now. For the contemporary period, 
we consider the policing of protests that 
emerged with a case study of Ferguson, Mis-
souri, following the police killing of Michael 
Brown.
The Ferguson protests and disorder and the 
overwhelming police response to this social 
unrest provide a reminder that, more than any 
other institution, police symbolize the Ameri-
can racial order. Despite improvement in some 
areas, the combustible mix that led to the 1960s 
disorders is still here. Police remain the ful-
crum for accumulated grievances.
In the 1960s, incidents (and sometimes ru-
mors) of police violence were most often what 
drew protesters, rioting protesters, and oppor-
tunistic rioters to the streets. Once on the 
street, police responses were a central factor in 
whether violence escalated. In 1967 police ac-
tion could often be described as too much too 
soon or too little too late. Sometimes there were 
two riots—the police and those they sought to 
control. Other factors include instances of fire-
crackers being heard as gunshots, of police 
mistakenly firing at each other, of police cover-
ing their badges; and of leadership, equipment, 
strategic, and logistical failures that limited ef-
fectiveness and increased anger on all sides 
(Marx 1971a). This article explores how the po-
licing of civil disorders in a context of protest 
has changed since the 1960s.
We begin with a consideration of factors rel-
evant to the relative absence of the large- scale 
disorders since the 1960s. Paralleling changes 
in the forms of disorder, we note a shift by re-
searchers to study the policing of disorders as 
a factor more broadly tied to efforts to control 
social movements and protest. Then, we review 
several problems with the policing of disorders 
identified by the Kerner Commission and the 
commission’s recommendations to mitigate 
them. We use the case of Ferguson in 2014 to 
illustrate significant changes in the policing of 
protests since Kerner. We consider three central 
questions: What changes in the policing of pro-
test and civil disorder are most noticeable since 
Kerner? What police practices “worked” in Fer-
guson and what practices did not? What are 
implications for the twenty- first century?
the abe yanCe Of l arge-  
sCale Civil disOrders
We have in general not seen a repeat of the 
massive state violence in response to crowd 
situations that was responsible for hundreds 
of deaths in the 1960s (Tilly 2003). Even the as-
sassination of Martin Luther King Jr. did not 
lead to extended and continued rioting beyond 
the initial outbursts, nor was it as heavy handed 
a police response as in previous times.1 The de-
cline in the frequency of civil disorders has 
been documented (Olzak and Shanahan 1996; 
Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996; Gooden 
and Myers 2018; Bentley- Edwards et al. 2018), 
but little research has been undertaken on rea-
sons for the decline and on changes in policing 
of disorders. Since the 1970s, scholars have 
shifted their focus away from disorders as such 
and toward the policing of social movements 
and protest events (see, for example, Marx 
1970a, 1988; della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl, 
Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Vitale 2005; della 
Porta, Peterson, and Reiter 2006; Waddington 
2007; Soule and Davenport 2009; Earl 2011; 
Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011; Gillham, Ed-
wards, and Noakes 2013; Wood 2014). This shift 
1. The Kerner report with its call for improved police responses appeared shortly before King’s death. Yet inde-
pendent of the Kerner report awareness had increased within law enforcement of the need to avoid the kinds of 
failures seen in Detroit, Newark, and Watts. This statement is of course relative to American history, internation-
ally and since the 1960s. Examples of post- 1960s failures in policing of civil disorders include the 1979 Greens-
boro massacre, the 1980 Miami race–McDuffie riots, and the six- day Rodney King riots in Los Angeles in 1992 
(Moore 2012; Webster and William 1992).
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away from studying civil disorders is no doubt 
related to their relative absence. Relevant fac-
tors in the decline likely include improved ways 
for filing grievances against police, the spread 
of civilian review boards, greater court recep-
tiveness to police liability cases, and establish-
ment of protest permitting systems (McCarthy 
and McPhail 1998; McPhail, Schweingruber, 
and McCarthy 1998; Schneider 2014).2 Yet, as 
many of the articles in this issue suggest, the 
racial injustices seen by the commission persist 
and in some ways have been worsened by the 
devastating impacts of the war on drugs (Alex-
ander 2011; Oliver 2008).
varying pOliCe respOnses tO 
prOtest and disOrders
Given the contemporary saliency of protests 
and the fact that disorders often ignite from 
protest events (such as Ferguson, Baltimore, 
Standing Rock, and Charlottesville), for this ar-
ticle we draw on scholarship from the policing 
of social movements and protest events to the-
orize the changes in policing of civil disorders. 
By civil disorders, we mean larger scale, disrup-
tive, public events directed at a dominant social 
order that can include acts of civil disobedience 
and direct action, confrontations with law en-
forcement and counter protesters, and behav-
ior such as looting, arson, and physical violence 
(Body- Gendrot 2017). Collective and individual 
acts that occur during civil disorders involve 
violence rituals, coordinated destruction, and 
opportunism whether directed at commodities, 
competing groups, or both (Tilly 2003; Wad-
dington 2007). Our definition recognizes that 
such actions may represent political acts seen 
as being of last resort (Hobsbawm 1964; Piven 
and Cloward 1979). Whether police view crowd 
behavior as protest or crime has important im-
plications for where responses fall on a con-
tinuum moving from communication to coer-
cion (Earl and Soule 2006; Wood 2007).
Contemporary research on the U.S. policing 
of protest and disorderly events has focused 
primarily on national special security events 
(such as G20 meetings), disruptive protest 
events extensively covered by the media (such 
as Occupy Wall Street), and on policing in large 
metro areas like New York City and Washing-
ton, D.C., where protests are routine (Gillham 
and Marx 2000; Vitale 2005, 2007; Fernandez 
2008; Starr, Fernandez, and Scholl 2011; Gill-
ham, Edwards, and Noakes 2013; Wood 2014; 
King 2017). This research finds that the policing 
of protest and disorder has changed dramati-
cally since the 1960s, although scholars debate 
whether the changes are driven more by inno-
vations in police behavior or by changes in pro-
test tactics (Earl 2011).
Police actions can facilitate, channel, or re-
press protests (Marx 1988; Earl 2003). During 
the 1950s and 1960s cycles of protest, police ap-
plied escalating levels of force to prevent or 
constrain protests and disorders (McCarthy 
and McPhail 1998). Such actions could result 
in on- the- job troubles such as injuries, deaths, 
and property damage, and in- the- job troubles 
such as public criticism, commissions, and 
pressure from political elites (Walker 1968; 
Waddington 1994).
In the aftermath of the Kerner Commission 
and others (such as the Violence Commission) 
researchers noted the development of a less 
confrontational approach by leading law en-
forcement agencies that emphasized negotiat-
ing with protesters the time, manner, and place 
of demonstrations. Adopted first in Washing-
ton, D.C., in the early 1980s, the negotiated man-
agement style of protest policing developed 
around an event permitting process, which in 
turn led to increased communication and co-
2. Just how independent, transparent, and effective current methods are is a different question, but the presence 
of these mechanisms, however imperfect, matters. In addition, when disorders occur they are likely to receive 
more balanced attention in the mass media and from the Justice Department than fifty years ago. Other pos-
sible factors for the abeyance of disorders include the appearance of stronger neighborhood, local community 
and professionalized national and other nongovernmental organizations (Noakes and Gillham 2006), and moves 
toward community policing, or at least greater receptiveness to community concerns. Finally, just as the war on 
drugs has devastated many minority communities by moving many black males younger than thirty into prison 
or placing them under some type of judicial supervision, this “war” has also removed potential participants from 
the pool of people who could participate in social movements and other forms of political activity (Oliver 2008).
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operation between police and protesters and 
an extended period of calm (McPhail, Schwe-
ingruber, and McCarthy 1998; McCarthy, 
McPhail, and Crist 1999). Yet, since the disrup-
tive World Trade Organization protests in Se-
attle in 1999 police- protester relations have 
been frequently more adversarial. Trust, coop-
eration, and communication have declined on 
both sides as police sought to incapacitate pro-
test and activists resisted such efforts (Noakes, 
Klocke, and Gillham 2005; Vitale 2005, 2007; 
Gillham and Noakes 2007; Gillham 2011; King 
2017).
These changes are noticeable relative to the 
1960s. Drawing on media reports, police and 
activist accounts, official after- action reports, 
and our direct field observations from August 
16 through August 18, we analyze policing of 
the 2014 Ferguson Missouri protests and disor-
der that developed. The Ferguson case is im-
portant because it provides an opportunity to 
study an infrequent occurrence of civil disorder 
and law enforcement’s response, and illustrates 
some broader national changes seen in many 
law enforcement agencies since the release of 
the Kerner report.
Kerner findings
Among problems identified by the Kerner Com-
mission were those involving operational plan-
ning and police control equipment (see table 
1). The first set of operational planning problems 
involved weaknesses in the dispatch- oriented 
command and control structure for policing 
disorders (Kerner Report 1968, 268). In the 
1960s, departments used a dispatch- driven 
command and control system according to 
which orders were delivered from a central lo-
cation via car radio to line officers on patrol. 
Officers responding to the scene of a crowd in-
cident radioed back to dispatch for help to dis-
perse the crowd. Yet, when supporting officers 
arrived at the scene, their presence and actions 
could increase tensions among those already 
angry and distrustful of police. Because radios 
were anchored to the patrol vehicle, officers at 
the scene were unable to easily communicate 
with commanders at headquarters. By the time 
commanders realized they and additional of-
ficers were needed on- site, it was often too late 
as disorder rapidly spread and escalated, as was 
the case in Detroit, Milwaukee, and Newark 
(Kerner Report 1968).
After a large- scale disorder was under way, 
police often had difficulty communicating with 
each other because they did not have radios on 
their person and no special radio frequencies 
had been established to handle the additional 
radio traffic associated with the disorder re-
sponse. Many departments did not have ade-
quate organizational and technical means to 
communicate either with police in neighboring 
jurisdictions or with state police and sheriff de-
partments. When other law enforcement agen-
cies were present, their radio frequencies were 
frequently incompatible, making it difficult to 
respond quickly in an organized way (Kerner 
Report 1968, 269).
To mitigate these command and control 
troubles, the commission recommended that, 
first, a model operational plan providing guide-
lines for responding to incidents and civil dis-
orders developed by the commission be dis-
tributed to all police departments;3 second, the 
federal government fund the development of 
miniaturized and portable radios for law en-
forcement; and, third, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission make enough frequencies 
available to police and other first responders 
(Kerner Report 1968, 269–70).
The second set of operational planning 
problems involved the lack of information or 
intelligence available to police about the plan-
ning of protests and disorder events, and about 
disorder events once they started (Kerner Re-
port 1968, 172–73, 269). The commission noted 
that many departments had little understand-
ing about the causes of unrest within primarily 
black urban areas, had poor relations with peo-
ple living in these segregated neighborhoods, 
and generally lacked reliable means for gather-
ing information about looming civil unrest. The 
lack of broad understanding, poor relations, 
and relevant pre- disorder information pre-
3. The plan was integrated into a larger Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planning prepared by the 
Research, Development and Planning Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (Smith and 
Kobetz 1968). It was released six months after the Kerner report.
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vented police from preparing adequately. More-
over, once civil disorders erupted, police had 
limited skills and methods for gathering infor-
mation. This made responding to rumors dif-
ficult. Furthermore, few formal ways to dissem-
inate accurate information about an incident 
or disorder were in place, leaving rumors and 
media to shape the public’s view of events. The 
commission recommended that police develop 
intelligence units to gather, evaluate, analyze, 
and disseminate information about potential 
civil disorders and during civil disorders (269).
Another set of problems identified involved 
police protective and control equipment. Most 
police departments did not provide officers ad-
equate self- protection equipment against rocks, 
bottles, and other projectiles. Wooden batons 
and service revolvers were the primary methods 
of control (Kerner Report 1968, 176). The com-
mission questioned the justification for using 
deadly force during civil disorders, noting the 
risk of killing or wounding innocent people, 
that the property crimes committed during dis-
order events did not warrant the use of lethal 
force, and that excessive force (including the 
inappropriate display of weapons) could pro-
Table 1. Kerner Findings: Mismanagement Factors, Problems, and Recommendations Related to 
Operational Planning and Police Equipment
Mismanagement 
Factor Problems Recommendation
Operational  
planning
Dispatch driven command and control 
system provides insufficient structure 
for responding to incidents and civil 
disorders
Police need operational plans that 
provide guidelines for responding to 
incidents and civil disorders
Line officer radios located in patrol 
vehicle. Thus, cannot communicate 
with dispatch unless in vehicle
Federal government should initiate and 
fund portable radio development 
programs
No special radio frequency available to 
use for public order emergencies; 
limited means to communicate with 
neighboring law enforcement 
agencies; neighboring agencies used 
incompatible radio frequencies
FCC should make enough frequencies 
available to police and related public 
safety services to meet needs for 
public order emergencies
Limited information gathered before 
and during civil disorder. Thus, 
unable to make reliable assessment 
and decisions in the field and unable 
to counter rumors
Develop intelligence units to gather, 
evaluate, analyze, and disseminate 
information about potential and 
actual civil disorders
Police equipment Minimal self-protection equipment 
available for frontline officers 
resulting in officer injury
Provide proper equipment and clothing 
to protect against threat to bodily 
harm
Batons and hand guns, the primary 
control tools available for local law 
enforcement, are insufficient for 
responding to civil disorders
Federal government should initiate 
program to test and evaluate 
nonlethal weapons for use by police, 
provide support to develop national 
standards to stimulate the private 
sector to produce these weapons, 
and direct funds to develop these 
weapons for local and state law 
enforcement agencies
Source: Authors’ tabulations.
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voke further disorder. The commission saw a 
need for control tools in the “middle range of 
physical force” that could be used “more hu-
manely” and effectively for regular policing and 
during times of unrest (176).
The commission recommended that the fed-
eral government undertake a program to test 
and evaluate “nonlethal” weapons for use by 
police, provide support “to establish criteria 
and standards specifications to stimulate [pri-
vate industry to produce] such items,” and di-
rect funds “to be used to develop appropriate 
tools . . . for local and state law enforcement 
agencies (Kerner Report 1968, 272). The com-
mission further warned against militarizing lo-
cal police because doing so risked “destroy[ing] 
the concept of civilian police as a public service 
agency dependent for effective operations on 
community cooperation and support” (272).
We next compare the commission’s recom-
mendations with what we saw in Ferguson to 
illustrate changes in the policing of disorder. 
The contrast between policing of the 1960s and 
today is clear, just as are commonalities. Al-
though many factors are involved, the changes 
in law enforcement seen in the illustrative case 
study that follows are consistent with the basic 
thrust of the Kerner recommendations and cer-
tainly had an important impact.
tr ansfOrmatiOn in the  
pOliCing Of disOrder
We next consider key events in Ferguson over 
the sixteen days between the killing of Michael 
Brown and his funeral. We then use the Fergu-
son case to highlight changes in police opera-
tional planning and equipment since Kerner 
and note some institutional forces contributing 
to these changes.
The Ferguson Case (August 9– 
August 25, 2014)
On August 9, shortly after noon, a Ferguson 
police officer shot and killed eighteen- year- old 
Michael Brown, an unarmed African American 
man. Backup officers from the Ferguson Police 
Department (PD) and the St. Louis County Po-
lice Department (SLCPD) rushed to the scene 
and pushed back an agitated crowd that had 
gathered. Officers reported an increasingly cha-
otic scene, with some crowd members making 
death threats to police and shots being fired 
nearby. In response, the SLCPD deployed their 
Tactical Operations Unit, then initiated the 
county’s Code 1000 Plan, which mobilized aid 
from neighboring police departments and ac-
tivated the Riot A Channel for exclusive com-
munication between responding law enforce-
ment agencies (IIR 2015, 5–9). More than fifty 
officers from multiple agencies quickly arrived 
and staged at two nearby locations. Crowds 
continued to grow at the homicide scene and 
formed at the police staging areas and outside 
the Ferguson PD headquarters. Protests con-
tinued at these locations until early morning 
August 10 (10–11).
Mid- morning of August 10, crowds reassem-
bled around the city. In response, SLCPD and 
Ferguson police chiefs established an “infor-
mal joint command” within the Ferguson PD 
headquarters and used the Code 1000 plan to 
request more officers from surrounding juris-
dictions. After an evening candle- light vigil at 
the site of the shooting, angry protesters surged 
into streets chanting “no justice, no peace.” 
They were met by police in riot gear holding 
rifles and shields (New York Times 2014). After 
this confrontation, the first civil disorder began 
when several protesters vandalized police ve-
hicles, damaged property, and looted busi-
nesses along West Florissant Avenue (Barker 
2014). Police deployed armored vehicles and 
canine units to protect officers from thrown 
projectiles and more reported gun fire.
The SLCPD chief took charge as incident 
commander and extended the Code 1000 Plan 
by initiating a formal Incident Command Sys-
tem (ICS) framework. The ICS, an organiza-
tional framework first developed by FEMA and 
adopted nationally by first responders, is “a 
standardized personnel management tool” that 
establishes an integrated organizational com-
mand and control framework which designates 
an incident commander to manage all person-
nel and make critical decisions (Bigley and 
Roberts 2001; St. Louis County 2013, 6). As part 
of the ICS police established an official com-
mand post in a mall on West Florissant Avenue. 
After allegedly giving dispersal orders, tactical 
teams fired smoke canisters and tear gas, push-
ing protesters and looters north into the town 
of Dellwood. That night, police made thirty- two 
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arrests (Barker 2014; Giegerich, Bogan, and Bell 
2014; Institute for Intergovernmental Research 
2015, 11–15).
Over the next several days, a similar cycle 
persisted of peaceful protests during the day-
time and a mix of peaceful, unruly, and illegal 
actions during the night. According to police 
reports, at night some citizens looted and 
burned businesses, threw Molotov cocktails 
and other projectiles at police lines, fired guns, 
and destroyed civilian and police vehicles. Po-
lice forcefully responded by driving armored 
vehicles into the streets, deploying tear gas and 
other less- lethal weapons, and making arrests 
(IIR 2015, 15–17, 58).
As news of the unrest spread through con-
ventional media and social media outlets, po-
lice intelligence reports indicated that people 
from across the region and country had begun 
arriving in Ferguson, some to protest and oth-
ers with intent to exploit opportunities for per-
sonal gain (IIR 2015, 18, 58). Local, county, and 
state political leaders, frustrated by the in-
creased disorder and negative media attention 
wanted the incident commander replaced. On 
August 14, Governor Nixon responded by de-
claring a state of emergency and making Mis-
souri State Highway Patrol Captain Johnson, 
an African American, incident commander. 
Protester and police interactions were calmer 
that night, perhaps because of the governor’s 
action (20).
The calm, though, was short lived. On Au-
gust 15, the Ferguson Police Department iden-
tified Darren Wilson as the officer who had 
killed Michael Brown and released a surveil-
lance video showing that Brown had allegedly 
stolen a package of cigars from a convenience 
store shortly before he was stopped by Wilson. 
A later unedited version of the video indicated 
that Brown may not have stolen the cigars 
(Smith 2017). Hundreds of people assembled 
outside the Ferguson Police Department head-
quarters to condemn release of the video, seen 
by many in the community as a ploy to demon-
ize Brown and justify the shooting. Like previ-
ous nights, people again engaged in rioting and 
looting while peaceful protesters looked on. 
This time, police stood by choosing not to act 
out of concern they would only make things 
worse (IIR 2015, 21–23).
August 16, Governor Nixon declared a state 
of emergency and imposed a midnight to 5:00 
a.m. curfew. In the streets, officers with hel-
mets, face protectors, gas masks, riot batons, 
shields, and Kevlar vests formed lines separat-
ing people on the streets and sidewalks from 
local businesses. Tactical teams in full battle 
gear moved small groups of people around the 
streets and sidewalks and stood guard at road-
blocks. That night police again used armored 
vehicles, lines of officers, less- lethal weapons, 
and arrests to disperse crowds (IIR 2015, 24–25).
On the evening of August 17, police reported 
that a large crowd attempted to overtake the 
command post. It is unclear whether this was 
the intent of those in the crowd or they had as-
sembled simply to protest police actions or the 
curfew order. Police dispatched a helicopter to 
provide overhead surveillance and a line of of-
ficers led by SWAT units used smoke bombs, 
tear gas, and other less- lethal weapons to move 
the crowd back north on West Florissant Ave-
nue. Several businesses were looted and a brawl 
between 150 people broke out. As the chaos in-
creased, all police teams were pulled back in 
hope to diffuse the anger of people in the 
streets. But the disorder raged on as the most 
violent night of unrest yet. The next day, Gov-
ernor Nixon lifted the curfew and ordered the 
National Guard to protect the command post, 
freeing up police officers to help with disorder 
control (IIR 2015, 26–28).
August 19 was a turning point. Hostile inter-
actions continued between protesters and po-
lice, but less rioting, property damage, and 
shots fired were reported. Over the next several 
days “a calm began to emerge”—as fewer peo-
ple protested and less anger was exhibited (IIR 
2015, 28). On August 21, the governor ordered 
the Missouri National Guard to withdraw from 
Ferguson. By August 24, police report that pro-
test had continued to decrease in size and “a 
sense of normalcy was returning.” On August 
25, Michael Brown was laid to rest. At his fa-
ther’s request, no protests occurred during the 
funeral (IIR 2015, 28–29).
Fifty Years After Kerner
We use the Ferguson case to consider our first 
major question: What has changed in the po-
licing of protest and civil disorder since the 
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Kerner report? We limit our analysis to changes 
in police operational planning related to com-
mand and control and the gathering and anal-
ysis of intelligence, and police equipment used 
(see table 2). After highlighting some of these 
changes, we identify institutional forces that 
have contributed to the changes.
Command and Control in Ferguson
Commanders’ abilities to quickly receive assis-
tance from other agencies and to communicate 
effectively across the chain of command has 
improved significantly since Kerner. For many 
years, St. Louis County has had a Code 1000 
Plan that aides nearby agencies in planning 
and control for civil disorders and disasters (St. 
Louis County 2013). When activated on August 
9, the nearest twenty- five police cars from var-
ious jurisdictions were immediately dispatched 
to the homicide scene along with a crowd- 
control mobile response team. Other officers 
self- deployed when they heard the Code 1000 
Table 2. Police Command and Control System, Intelligence Practices, and Protective and Control 
Equipment During Disorders in the 1960s and in Ferguson in 2014
1960s Ferguson
Command and 
control system
Dispatch driven Code 1000 Plan and ICS
No special radio frequency for 
emergencies
RIOT A radio frequencies
Radios located in patrol vehicles 
incompatible with radios used by 
neighboring jurisdictions
Vehicle and portable radios, cell 
phones, and text messaging across 
command chain
Intelligence  
practices
No formal intelligence units in  
most PDs
Joint intelligence unit formed from 
SLCPD, SLMPD, SL Fusion Center; 
assistance from MO Info Analysis 
Center
Limited information gathered before 
civil disorder
No information gathered before civil 
disorder
Limited information gathered during 
civil disorder
Event data collected by intel unit in 
static and real time via undercover 
officers, officers in streets, permits, 
aircraft, police video-streaming, social 
media monitoring
Information about outside protest 
groups collected by intel unit; relied 
on cross-national diverse intelligence 
information systems including fusion 
centers
Self-protection 
equipment
Minimal self-protection available Helmets, gas masks, Kevlar vests, and 
shields (line officers and tactical units)
Military grade body armor, battle dress, 
and armored vehicles (tactical units)
Control  
equipment
Baton and guns Less-lethal weapons to disperse and 
incapacitate, such as impact, 
acoustic, and chemical irritants (line 
officers and tactical units)
Armored vehicles and displayed 
military firepower to deter and 
intimidate (tactical units)
Source: Authors’ tabulations.
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request (Belmar and Kleinknecht 2016; IIR 
2015). Besides providing a mechanism to 
promptly mobilize mutual aid, the Code 1000 
Plan also provided a framework for managing 
personnel during the early hours of the crises. 
For example, for each five officers that re-
sponded to the Code 1000 request, a command-
ing officer was deployed. The commanding of-
ficer then made decisions in the field and 
communicated with the SLCPD chief who had 
initiated the Code 1000 (IIR 2015).
Once it became clear that the civil disorder 
would not quickly dissipate, law enforcement 
officials initiated an ICS framework, which for-
mally designated the incident commander and 
required establishment of an operations com-
mand post and lines of communication across 
the ICS chain of command, designated an op-
erations officer to coordinate tactical opera-
tions and a public information officer to com-
municate to the media and community, 
established law enforcement staging areas, and 
assigned support staff (St. Louis County 2013, 
6; Bigley and Roberts 2001; FEMA 2013). Reli-
ance on such extensive and versatile opera-
tional guidelines as provided by the Code 1000 
Plan and ICS framework indicates an organi-
zational shift in law enforcement’s command 
and control structure far beyond what the 
Kerner Commission envisioned.
Relatedly, communication technologies 
have of course changed dramatically since 
Kerner. Police agencies now have access to por-
table radios on the same frequencies as vehicle 
radios and as radios in other jurisdictions. In 
Ferguson, the county dispatcher could contact 
agencies needed to respond to the initial call 
for assistance and special RIOT channels were 
available. Most radios synced well, despite in-
teroperability issues still common elsewhere 
(IIR 2015; Weiser 2007). When there were fail-
ures, a communications officer activated the 
IP Interoperability and Collaboration System 
and bridged communication networks across 
all agencies (Kanowitz 2016). Interoperability 
was also provided through officers’ smart 
phones which received bulk message texts via 
a private messaging service (IIR 2015, 106) and 
likely allowed the sharing of maps, photos, and 
videos among officers in the streets and com-
mand center.
Intelligence in Ferguson
Intelligence practices have also radically 
changed. Today, police departments rely on in- 
house intelligence units, new surveillance tech-
nologies, and cooperation among law enforce-
ment across a national network of fusion 
centers (IIR 2015; Gillham 2011; Narr et al. 
2006). Ferguson police did not have an active 
intelligence unit when the uprising began. 
However, once the ICS protocol was initiated, 
a joint intelligence unit was established to 
monitor the civil disorder and related issues. 
The unit drew officers and other resources from 
the separate intelligence units of the SLCPD 
and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, 
the St. Louis Fusion Center, and the Missouri 
State Fusion Center (IIR 2015, 82).
The quickly assembled intelligence unit was 
able to gather event data as the protests mobi-
lized and the disorders spread (IIR 2015, 129). 
The intelligence unit relied on various local re-
sources including local agency helicopters 
equipped with the latest forward- looking infra-
red (FLIR) night vision and moving map tech-
nologies, undercover intelligence officers cir-
culating among the crowds, and officers 
tracking social media (St. Louis County Police 
Department 2014, 19; IIR 2015, 82, 101). Much 
of this locally based intelligence gathering was 
conducted using “new surveillance technolo-
gies” (Marx 2002, 2016), such as Geofeedia, a 
surveillance platform that links social media 
posts with the location of the posting. Geofee-
dia showed the intelligence unit the exact loca-
tions of the worst disorder from pictures and 
video posted by protesters (Ozer 2016).
The joint intelligence unit also relied on out-
side assistance. FBI aerial surveillance pin-
pointed the location of fires and where people 
were gathered (Tucker 2015). National law en-
forcement and private sector analysts provided 
the intelligence unit “information through di-
verse intelligence information systems” (IIR 
2015, 83), including the hub- and- spoke network 
of seventy- eight fusion centers distributed na-
tionwide (82).
Although secrecy surrounding a sensitive 
topic inhibits a full understanding of where in-
formation came from and how it was used in-
ternally, the public information officer used 
some information to counter rumors and pro-
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tester narratives of events, and to portray police 
in a positive light (IIR 2015). The use of public 
information officers in these ways is a common 
national practice (Gillham, Edwards, and 
 Noakes 2013; Narr et al. 2006). The surveillance 
and information acquisition and sharing capac-
ity has expanded significantly since the 1960s.
Self- protection Equipment in Ferguson
Police involved in management of the Ferguson 
disorder were well equipped in protective gear 
relative to the 1960s (see table 2). Line officers 
in Ferguson wore their regular duty uniforms 
and Kevlar vests and were issued protective 
equipment depending on the officer assign-
ment. Agents policing the most disorderly lo-
cations (such as the SLCPD and Missouri State 
Highway Patrol) had helmets, handheld 
shields, face shields, and gas masks (IIR 2015, 
57). More visually and technically striking was 
the protective gear worn by tactical officers: 
“battle dress uniforms,” some in camouflage, 
military boots, utility belts and web guns, Kev-
lar helmets with night vision equipment, gog-
gles, gasmasks, “level- three heavy vests,” and 
some body armor. They also had available ar-
mored vehicles for safe transit and to extract 
officers and injured citizens from volatile set-
tings (IIR 2015; Pickler 2015; Belmar and Klein-
knecht 2016).
Control Equipment in Ferguson
The range of mid- level weapons that aug-
mented officers’ batons and service revolvers 
contrasted markedly with the 1960s. Line offi-
cers and tactical units had electronic control 
weapons such as Tasers and an arsenal of vari-
ous projectiles, which had varying levels of im-
pact on their human targets. Less painful and 
less likely to cause serious injury were hand- 
thrown Stingerball devices that released rubber 
balls and pyrotechnic fire and sounds. More 
painful and likely to injure people were bean 
bag rounds fired from shotguns, and Pepper-
Ball rounds and wooden batons both fired from 
handheld launchers. Smoke canisters were 
fired to disorient people in the streets, break 
up groups, and assess wind direction before 
deploying tear gas (IIR 2015, 46–49).
Police had more than mid- level weapons 
available, however. Tactical units relied heavily 
on military- grade equipment and techniques. 
They carried automatic rifles, had strapped to 
their vests high- capacity magazines containing 
one to two hundred rounds of ammunition for 
their weapons, and used armored vehicles to 
disperse crowds (IIR 2015). The Lenco Bearcat, 
a close cousin to the U.S. military mine- resistant, 
ambush- protected vehicle, was the most prom-
inent type of armored vehicle deployed. The 
SLCPD’s Bearcat was twenty feet long and ten 
feet wide, weighed eighteen thousand pounds, 
and had an elevated platform that would allow 
access to the third floor of a building (Lenco 
2014; Belmar and Kleinknecht 2016, 36). Tactical 
officers used the platform to post lookouts and 
snipers who pointed their rifles at people in the 
crowd while using their high- powered sights to 
search for people with weapons (IIR 2015). At-
tached to the Bearcat was a military long- range 
acoustical device or “sound cannon,” which 
would transmit verbal announcements or warn-
ings across long distances or high- pitched, ear- 
damaging tones to disperse crowds.
Institutional Forces of Change
Several institutional forces contributed to these 
organizational and technological response 
changes. Closely connected to the Kerner Com-
mission recommendations was creation of the 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to research 
and standardize police equipment and tech-
nologies. Another important set of institutional 
forces link to the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). These include requirements 
that law enforcement agencies receiving federal 
grants must adopt the ICS framework, creation 
of the fusion center network, and the establish-
ment of antiterrorism grant programs.4
National Institute of Justice and  
Development of Police Technologies
The various mid- level weapons and communi-
cation and surveillance technologies available 
4. Space limitations prevent us from elaborating on other similar institutional forces including the rise of para-
military police units and the Department of Defense 1033 Program that leases military equipment to local law 
enforcement agencies (see Kraska and Cubellis 1997; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Balko 2013; Wood 2014).
1 3 2  f I f t I e t h  a n n I v e r s a r y  o f  t h e  k e r n e r  r e p o r t
r s f :  t h e  r u s s e l l  s a g e  f o u n d a t i o n  j o u r n a l  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s
to law enforcement in Ferguson and nationally 
were developed with assistance from the NIJ, 
the research branch of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. The NIJ was formed in 1969 following 
recommendations made by President John-
son’s 1966 Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice and the Kerner 
Commission report. A central purpose of the 
NIJ was to promote the innovation and adop-
tion of police technologies used to manage pro-
test and disorder (National Institute of Justice 
1994, 10, 44.).
The NIJ promoted this innovation and adop-
tion through four mechanisms. First, in the 
early 1970s, the Institute developed the Police 
Weapons System Program to assess “policies 
and practices in the acquisition and use of of-
fensive and defensive weapons by law enforce-
ment” and evaluated existing police weapons 
systems not yet widely adopted (1994, 45). Sec-
ond, simultaneously it launched the Law En-
forcement Standards Laboratory with the dual 
purpose of establishing “scientifically based, 
voluntary commercial manufacturing stan-
dards” and certifying a nationwide network of 
“laboratories where equipment items could be 
evaluated according to those standards” (45). 
By 1975, the laboratory had developed perfor-
mance standards for technologies recom-
mended by the Kerner report including por-
table radios and defensive gear such as riot 
helmets, light weight body armor, and ballistic 
shields. Over the years, the NIJ has continued 
to update these standards, including for new 
surveillance technologies (National Institute of 
Justice 1994; Nunn 2001).
Third, the NIJ provided research grants to 
improve existing weapons and develop new 
ones. These grants were distributed through 
projects such as the Less- Lethal Technologies 
Program started in 1986, and Joint Non- Lethal 
Weapons Program started in 1996 (Wood 2014). 
Through these grants, less- lethal products such 
as pepper spray and adjustable- velocity projec-
tile launchers were developed (National Insti-
tute of Justice 1994, 52). Fourth, the NIJ joined 
with universities and the private sector to dis-
seminate knowledge about these technologies 
through commercial trade journals, trade 
shows that coincided with police conventions, 
and guides for less- lethal weapons (Weapons 
and Protective Systems Technologies Center 
2010; Wood 2014).
By the time of the Ferguson protests, a mar-
ket had been created whereby law enforcement 
agencies across the country could find power-
ful and affordable middle- range weapons and 
other technologies (Wood 2014; Balko 2013).
Department of Homeland Security and Change
The DHS, created in the aftermath of the ter-
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been 
responsible for three other institutional forces 
that have shaped law enforcement’s adoption 
of the ICS framework and new technologies 
used in response to protest and civil disorder. 
The first is the requirement that state and local 
agencies who receive federal grants must adopt 
FEMA ICS protocols.
The ICS structure was initially developed by 
the U.S. Forest Service and supporting state and 
local agencies in reaction to several organiza-
tional problems encountered by first respond-
ers during catastrophic wildfires in California 
in 1970 (Chase 1980).5 After the Forest Service 
and other fire agencies adopted the ICS frame-
work, FEMA adopted ICS as a best practice and 
recommended that other first responder agen-
cies, including law enforcement, do the same 
(Cardwell and Cooney 2000). However, most 
law enforcement agencies were slow to adopt 
ICS (Cardwell and Cooney 2000; Buck, Trainor, 
and Aguirre 2006).
After establishing the DHS, President 
George W. Bush directed state and local agen-
cies that receive federal grant funds, including 
law enforcement agencies, to adopt FEMA’s ICS 
approach for managing emergencies.6 Today, 
as a consequence of this directive, most law 
enforcement departments have adopted a 
5. These problems (similar to the organizational planning problems identified in the Kerner report) included 
“overloaded spans of control . . . , lack of reliable information, inadequate and incompatible communication, . . . 
and unclear lines of authority” (Lutz and Lindell 2008, 123).
6. HSPD- 5, Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents, February 28, 2003 (accessed May 4, 2018, https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Homeland%20Security%20Presidential%20Directive%205.pdf).
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FEMA modeled ICS for responding in emer-
gency situations, including situations like the 
civil disorder that broke out in Ferguson (IIR 
2015).
Another DHS- related institutional force was 
the establishment of a national fusion center 
network. Fusion centers, paid for with post- 9/11 
federal grants, are charged with receiving, ana-
lyzing, gathering, and sharing threat- related 
information across federal, state, local, tribal, 
territorial, and private- sector partners (DHS 
2017). Analysts in local or state fusion centers 
send information to other centers and to the 
central DHS watch center (DHS 2017). As noted 
in our case, this network provided vital infor-
mation to the Ferguson intelligence unit as 
they have to local police agencies responding 
to other recent protests and disorders (Gillham, 
Edwards, and Noakes 2013; Police Executive Re-
search Forum 2015; Meyer 2017).
A final institutional force is DHS grants pro-
vided to law enforcement agencies for national 
security. Since 2003, Urban Areas Security Ini-
tiative (UASI) grants have provided more than 
$500 million annually to the largest metropol-
itan areas in the United States, enabling police 
to acquire military equipment and less- lethal 
weapons (Balko 2013; DHS 2014; IIR 2015, 58). 
These funds are intended to “address the 
unique planning, organization, equipment, 
training, and exercise needs of high- threat, 
high- density urban areas, and assists them in 
building an enhanced and sustainable capacity 
to prevent, protect against, respond to, and re-
cover from acts of terrorism” (FEMA 2010, 2). 
But these funds pay for equipment used for 
more than anti- terrorism measures. The SLCPD 
used UASI grants to purchase their Bearcat, 
protective gear, and less- lethal weapons used 
during the Ferguson unrest (Belmar and 
Kleinknecht 2016; IIR 2015).
In sum, the provision of federal resources 
and funding requirements helped standardize 
practices, improved communication across 
agencies, and provided support for new prac-
tices and technologies unlikely to be locally 
funded. Clearly, in important ways the policing 
of protest has dramatically changed since 
Kerner. Next, we consider what worked and 
what did not work as a consequence of the de-
scribed changes.
hOw many Cheers? sOme impaCts in 
fergusOn and be yOnd
Besides organizational and technical changes, 
we note changes in police culture, specifically, 
better empirical understanding of crowd be-
havior and the rights of citizens. In many cases 
this has resulted in a softening of, and greater 
differentiation in, police responses, even as this 
brings risks of under- reaction. Yet simultane-
ously some law and order responses to crowds 
have hardened, bringing risks of over- reaction 
(for example, blurring the lines between local 
police and the military with respect to available 
tools, tactics, and cooperation).
Given the vast time period and significant 
variation across places and types of events any 
conclusions about consequences of “what 
worked and what has not worked since Kerner?” 
must be tentative. Furthermore, any consider-
ation of what works in the context of a semi- 
secret institution with unique powers of coer-
cion charged with maintaining an unequal 
status quo must be qualified more than for 
other less adversarial institutions. Yet, some 
broader conclusions can be drawn from the 
Ferguson case with respect to current police 
command and control systems, intelligence 
practices, and equipment (see table 3).
The organizational and equipment changes 
seen in Ferguson were not accompanied by ci-
vilian or police fatalities. As noted in table 3, 
policing practices employed during Ferguson 
worked in some ways to deal with issues raised 
by the Kerner Commission (such as rapid mo-
bilization, clearer chain of command, improved 
communication within and between agencies 
and officers, dispelling of rumors through pub-
lic information officers, better intelligence dur-
ing events, safety equipment, use of less- lethal 
weapons).
Yet, paradoxically, these practices can be ac-
companied by ironic or unforeseen conse-
quences. Consider the ways local police have 
become more militarized—a factor the Kerner 
report clearly warned against. Although in-
creasing militarization provides protective 
equipment for police and superior force to po-
tentially deter violent assaults against police or 
others, it can also reinforce feelings of fear and 
anger and the view that police are an occupy-
ing army rather a public force that protects and 
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Table 3. Police Command and Control System, Intelligence Practices, and Protective and Control 
Equipment Used in Ferguson in 2014 
Worked Did Not Work
Command and  
control system
1000 Plan/ICS Plan Provided efficient mechanism to 
rapidly mobilize officers from 
multiple agencies
Drew self-deploying officers 
undertrained in disorder control 
and without direct supervision
Established clear chain of command 
for decision-making, 
communicating orders, and 
communicating with public to 
dispel rumors
Incident commander communicated 
orders inconsistently resulting in 
contradictory and under-
enforcement that escalated 
disorder
Misinformation provided in cigar 
video inflamed community 
members and escalated disorder
RIOT radio frequency, 
portable radios, cell 
phones, and text 
messaging
Facilitated efficient and closed 
communication between officers
Prevented communication system 
overload
Closed communications minimized 
public transparency about police 
actions
Intelligence practices
Local intelligence unit 
with extensive 
in-house surveillance 
and analytic tools 
available
Used extensive in-house surveillance 
and analytic tools to gather and 
analyze multiple sources and large 
amounts of static and real-time 
information; able to quickly assess 
risk and respond, and to collect 
evidence for prosecution
Revealed extent of national 
surveillance system with capacity 
to violate privacy rights; created 
distrust and chilled protest
National fusion center 
network 
Used extensive national surveillance 
and analytic tools to gather and 
analyze multiple sources and large 
amounts of static and real-time 
information; able to inform 
Ferguson intelligence unit about 
events there and potential outsider 
threats
Revealed extent of national 
surveillance system with capacity 
to violate privacy rights; created 
distrust and chilled protest
Control equipment  
and techniques
Self-protection 
equipment
Minimized individual injury to 
officers in the field
Distanced officers from community 
members, chilled protest
Deployment of mili - 
tary grade equip-
ment 
Display of firepower may have 
deterred some disorder; armored 
vehicles provided way to extract 
officers and injured protesters from 
volatile settings
Frightened and angered community 
members, delegitimized police in 
local communities and nationally, 
may have escalated disorder, risk of 
mass fatalities
Use of less-lethal 
weapons
Prevented deaths and reduced 
incident of serious injuries
Frightened and angered community 
members, delegitimized police in 
local communities and nationally, 
more people affected by police use 
of force, may have escalated disorder
Source: Authors’ tabulations.
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serves its community. First Amendment activ-
ities may be chilled, already damaged relations 
may be worsened, and police further delegiti-
mized. If disorder persists, a militarized force 
can attract more people into the streets out of 
curiosity, excitement, or anger (Gillham and 
Marx 2000). Another risk is that officers armed 
with automatic weapons might inadvertently 
kill many citizens or other officers.
Less- lethal weapons also raise questions. In 
Ferguson, the police use of less- lethal weapons 
might have prevented fatalities. Yet the meth-
ods were controversial. Police claimed they 
used tear gas to disperse crowds. But com-
plaints were lodged that police used it to pun-
ish protesters, gave either no or inadequate 
warnings to disperse before using, and gas 
seeped into adjacent homes (IIR 2015, 49–51). 
As is true of military- grade equipment, the use 
of less- lethal weapons worked in some ways, 
even as it created problems. The question of 
what worked and what did not is in many ways 
a question of the trade- offs, paradoxes, and iro-
nies inherent in any intervention in complex 
social environments.
Implications for the Twenty- First Century
We conclude with two sets of issues—one em-
pirical and one evaluative to address a final 
question: What are the implications of changes 
in policing of disorder for a democratic Amer-
ican society in the twenty- first century?
Empirical Issues
Social scientists generally have a terrible rep-
utation for predicting the future. Thus, a note 
of caution is needed regarding sweeping con-
clusions and predictions about the trends we 
identified. It is too easy to assume that the 
patterns from the past will be present in the 
future, or, if they are, that they will be found in 
the same ratios and be accounted for by the 
same causal factors as previously. In the re-
search presented here, any conclusions must 
be tempered by the fact that there is an always 
evolving, dynamic, and fluid conflictual dance 
between police and those involved in protest 
and disorder (Gillham and Marx 2000). But, 
holding apart questions about trying to pre-
dict the future, we build off Marx’s (1998) ear-
lier reflections on the developing ethos of U.S. 
policing since the late 1960s to draw some em-
pirical conclusions relevant for today (see ta-
ble 4).
In the decades since Kerner, rather than tak-
ing an explicitly adversarial and intentionally 
violent approach specifically against protests, 
police have often sought a more velvet- gloved, 
neutral, measured stance, even as the nearby, 
out of sight, iron fist of the National Guard, 
military, and hardware with varying degrees of 
lethality could be quickly mobilized. The polic-
ing of protest has thus become more accepted 
and better understood as a routine part of local 
policing. Although the police hardly welcome 
them, mass demonstrations today in general 
no longer arouse the hostility or fear they pre-
viously did. Yet large- scale disorders that spill 
out of protests like that in Ferguson still create 
conditions where police may react in ways that 
violate civil liberties, have a chilling effect on 
nonviolent protest, and escalate disorders, just 
as they did in the 1960s and historically, 
whether the issue was race or unions.
But today law enforcement is less quick to 
automatically categorize all those in the streets 
as riffraff, criminals, rebellious adolescents, 
manipulated students, or agents of a foreign 
power. Rather, they are often seen as citizens 
with rights, though they are expected to keep 
their disorder within bounds. More than in the 
1960s, police view their job to be managing 
rather than repressing protest, protecting the 
right to demonstrate and guaranteeing due pro-
cess of law and to use a minimum amount of 
force to restore order (even to those whose 
views they may find intolerable). The presence 
of video, cell phone cameras, and body cam-
eras, with their potential for accountability can 
support this.
Exceptions to this trend are numerous (see 
note 1). The pattern of police pacification itself 
involves a series of interrelated developments 
and may not continue in the face of wrench-
ing social changes or widespread social un-
rest. Nor is it unilateral across dimensions, 
groups, or contexts—as any venture into mar-
ginalized, ethnically diverse, lower- income ar-
eas or discussions with those who have had 
their rights violated and their bodies assaulted 
can attest (Wood 2007). But viewed in com-
parative and historical terms in which the 
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standard police response was, and in many 
countries still is, to prohibit demonstrations 
or to fire or charge into crowds, the trends 
matter. The ethos of demonstration policing 
Marx saw thirty years after Kerner, holds, if 
with some changes in 2018 (Marx 1998; see ta-
ble 4 and appendix).
Moral and Political Issues
Apart from what can be seen or empirically 
demonstrated are questions of interpretation 
involving moral and political judgments. With 
respect to the latter, what can be said about the 
impact of more controlled (and what are seen 
conventionally to be effective) police re-
sponses? We need to ask effective for whom 
and by what standards?
How should we judge developments in the 
management of disorders? Is law enforce-
ment’s ability to avoid killing protesters in 
the streets or to intervene preventively a sign 
of progress? Is this a cause for some modest 
celebration, or at least appreciation? Cer-
tainly, the avoidance of provocation, injury 
or loss of life, cities on fire, and escalation, 
as well as decreasing hatred and alienation 
are positive. Full- scale riots leave deep reser-
voirs of bitterness on all sides and are con-
ducive to backlash and draconian policies. 
We saw that clearly with the backlash and 
weakening of the civil rights movement re-
lated to Nixon’s presidency. It is hard to see 
who really profited from the prolonged 1960s 
disorders. It is much easier to see short- run 
costs (Shellow et al. 2018).7
The development of a more pacific, demo-
Table 4. The Evolving Ethos of the Policing of Protests and Civil Disorders in the United States  
Since 1967
 1.  Police are servants of the law rather than the private army of whoever happens to be in power.
 2.  Law and policy are extended to tactics that had once been ignored and unregulated.
 3.  The law must be viewed flexibly, and a broad pragmatic view of the likely consequences of police 
action needs to be taken.
 4.  The primary goal of police in conventional crowd situations is to manage them to see that they do 
not get out of hand.
 5.  Emphasis is on prevention rather than responding after the fact.
 6.  A coproduction of order should involve a decentralized and delegated reliance on citizens to 
enforce the law and to control themselves.
 7.  Emphasis is placed on science and technology involving, first, efforts to engineer physical and 
social environments while minimizing to the extent possible the militarization of local police or 
using a technical method simply because it is available, and, second, relatively dispassionate 
intelligence gathering and analysis. Information technology is central to police managing 
information about police themselves, events, and protesters.
 8.  Efforts are made to learn from past events to be better prepared the next time, yet with flexibility, 
avoiding being rigidly captured by current en vogue doctrines.
 9.  The federal leadership role is stronger from the start. This involves an effort to develop uniform 
approaches across soft as well as hard police methods; to increase communication, integration, and 
cooperation to create more uniform, standardized operations and procedures across local, state, and 
federal authorities; and to create national standards and best practices.
10.  Police are more militarized, particularly with regards to equipment. Logistical, organizational, and 
communication borders between local, regional, and state control agencies, and between them and 
the military, are weaker.
Source: Authors’ tabulations (adapted from Marx 1998).
Note: Italicized text are additions. 
7. Rob Shellow and his colleagues note how outcomes varied in the short run aftermath by city characteristics 
and type of event.
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cratic policing ethos is not without contradic-
tions, challenges, risks and trade- offs relative 
to other models (Marx 1988; Gillham and Marx 
2000). As noted earlier, we need to ask what 
does it mean to say that a police response 
works? With health care or schools, we seek 
maximum effectiveness. But for police in a dem-
ocratic society we need optimal (rather than 
maximal) effectiveness. Practices must be con-
tinually reexamined given changing conditions, 
tactics, and actors. In the case of efforts to cre-
ate more professional police and to regulate 
discretion in crowd situations, the challenge is 
in finding the right mix such that honoring dis-
cretion does not put police beyond the law and 
responsible political control, and that regulat-
ing discretion does not introduce undue rigid-
ity. Order needs to be maintained and the law 
(with its vagaries and conflicts) followed, but 
not at great cost to citizens’ rights, the elimina-
tion of protest as a tool for social change, or 
the permanent institutionalization of strong 
control responses temporarily created and jus-
tified by a major crisis (such as 9/11). In such 
cases, strong oversight and renewal procedures 
are necessary to keep responses measured and 
proportionate.
There is no guarantee that the enhance-
ments of police powers relative to crowds will 
be used to protect, rather than to undermine 
democracy. A democratic society must contin-
ually ask the question, “how efficient do we 
want police to be?” Democratic societies have 
traditionally been willing to sacrifice a degree 
of order for increased liberty, but not in times 
of crisis. At such times the danger of a creeping 
(or galloping) downhill spiral is ever present. 
When liberty is reduced on behalf of order, 
transparency is particularly important, as is 
avoiding the risk of artificially created or exag-
gerated crises to justify that sacrifice.
We can ask that a bandage or pain reliever 
do its job and certainly not make an injury 
worse, even as it is not a cure. President John-
son’s charge to the commission was muddied 
regarding the link between his three often- 
cited questions (“what happened, why did it 
happen and what can be done to prevent it 
happening again”). The it was taken to mean 
riot stoppage. But what was really needed was 
a fourth question separating it as riot control 
from it as racial injustice (Marx 1970b, 2018). 
What it takes to prevent or stop a civil disorder 
is distinct (other than the issue of police abuse 
that can precipitate and contribute to disorder) 
from changes in economic and political op-
portunity, education, housing, health, and the 
many other factors related to inequality that 
propel disorders.
Improved and more effective police re-
sponses can often stop disorders from escalat-
ing. But to the extent that they are unfairly re-
pressive and deter legitimate protest, they may 
deepen racial injustice and the anger and de-
spair that help fuel disorders.
Democratic societies experience a continual 
tension between the desire for order and the 
desire for liberty. Although, as the case of the 
police state suggests, one can have the former 
without the latter, it is not possible to have a 
society with liberty that does not also have a 
minimum degree of order. The balance be-
tween these will vary depending on the context 
and time period. Policing in a democracy seeks 
to avoid the extremes of either anarchy or re-
pression.
In an open democratic society that respects 
the dignity of the individual and values volun-
tary and consensual behavior and the nonvio-
lent resolution of conflicts, police—with their 
power, secrecy, and use of violence and decep-
tion—are an anomaly. They are charged with 
using undemocratic means to help create dem-
ocratic ends. Police offer an ethical and moral 
paradox that should forever make democratic 
citizens vigilant.
This paradox is evident in the fact that a 
democratic society needs protection both by 
police and from police. Restrictions on police 
power are not an adequate guarantee of free-
dom. Taken too far, they may even guarantee 
its opposite, as private interests reign un-
checked or citizens take the law into their own 
hands in the face of increased disorder, or 
both. Yet a police force with too much power 
is also a danger. President Abraham Lincoln 
posed the dilemma well when he asked, “must 
a government, of necessity, be too strong for 
the liberties of its’ own people, or too weak to 
maintain its’ existence?” This paradox remains 
one of the major challenges of democratic gov-
ernance.
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appendix: wOrKing fOr the  
Kerner COmmissiOn and  
rel ated refleCtiOns
Gary T. Marx had the good fortune to work for 
the commission as part of a research group led 
by Rob Shellow and studied police behavior 
and types of disorder. When the Kerner Com-
mission studied questions of the police and 
civil disorders, very little social science re-
search had been undertaken to inform the anal-
ysis; the dominant control ethos was a hard- 
line, law and order approach in a context of a 
decentralized federal law enforcement system.
Marx describes the experience of working 
for the commission and on a suppressed report 
The Harvest of Racism (2018; Shellow et al. 2018), 
published on the fiftieth anniversary of its writ-
ing. For Marx, the focus on these issues helped 
define over five decades of scholarly work. The 
chance to work on these questions at the begin-
ning of a career with the abundant resources, 
legitimation, and access of a national commis-
sion was most fortuitous and sustaining. That 
experience provided data, research questions, 
and scholarly connections that lasted a lifetime 
on topics such as police behavior in riots and 
intelligence gathering, types of riot, counter- 
rioters and community police patrols, the im-
plications of the minority or majority group 
identity of activists and researchers, and, more 
broadly the study of social movements and 
mass behavior and of the requisites for social 
order (Marx 1970a, 1970b, 1971a, 1971b, 1974, 
1988, 1998, 2002, 2016; Marx and Archer 1971; 
Marx and Useem 1971; Marx and McAdam 1994; 
Gillham and Marx 2000, 2003).
Working for the Kerner Commission sensi-
tized Marx to the importance and neglect of 
the softer ethos as applied to crowds. The im-
portance of this was heightened in a candid 
conversation with a high- ranking member of 
the Chicago Police Department shortly after 
the police violence during the 1968 Democratic 
Convention. The commander indicated how 
unprofessional his department had behaved. 
He said that as a commander in a protest situ-
ation he is willing to listen, to negotiate, to tol-
erate minor infractions, and to keep a low pro-
file. He felt strongly that saving lives should be 
more important than protecting property or 
symbols. He believed that demonstrations 
could actively help create, rather than under-
mine, political stability (at least relative to not 
permitting or responding violently to them). 
The extensive media coverage of Chicago police 
attacking protesters was a public relations di-
saster and such behavior made the police job 
much more difficult. At the time, his views were 
heretical and he left the police soon after, but 
in the decades since they have become more 
widely shared among major police leaders in 
the United States. The management of disor-
ders continues to evolve.
How control agents frame events bears di-
rectly on control responses. If they are defined 
as (or only as) violations of law and order and 
the criminal code, then hard repression is the 
more likely response. If, in contrast, they are 
also seen as connected to understandable pro-
tests because grievances are present (apart 
from whether police are in sympathy with 
these) or because citizen’s have the right to ex-
press their concerns, then a soft communica-
tions approach, particularly at the outset, is 
more likely (Tilly 2000; Gillham and Noakes 
2007). Adopting either approach to the exclu-
sion of the other brings risks of unwanted un-
der- or overreaction.
Apart from the institutional and cultural fac-
tors discussed in the article, the greater prom-
inence of softer approaches is likely tied to a 
shift from the late 1960s to the present in the 
ratio of non- or less focused crowd- protest 
events to ones where a protest theme is more 
directly in evidence. A conflict is also possible 
in the communications offered the public by 
police and political leaders, versus that coming 
from protest groups. For the former, the tilt is 
toward a definition of disorder and criminal 
behavior; for the latter, it is toward a protest 
definition. Within these groups are conflicts as 
well, control groups divided over soft and hard 
approaches and protest groups divided be-
tween orderly disorder (to coin a phrase) and 
random destruction and assaults (favored by 
fringe groups).
The social and psychological characteristics 
and location of control agents are related to 
such definitions, but more objective character-
istics also are likely to be. Thus the presence 
of a widely shared belief among those in the 
streets that direct action is needed to call at-
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tention to a problem, within a context of an 
ongoing political dispute and a planned event 
whose organizers go through a permitting pro-
cess are likely to be differentiated from spon-
taneous, less organized, or unorganized gath-
erings that have no clear leader or group to 
communicate with, nor a specific precipitating 
event (Gillham and Noakes 2007). Marx consid-
ers these and other factors in seeking objective 
measures for how events are likely to be labeled 
as either protest or disorder (1970a). However, 
because events often show much internal vari-
ation (by types of participant, activities, places, 
and times within the event) rarely will an event 
approach the ideal type at either end of the 
continuum.
The views expressed by the officer men-
tioned contrast markedly with those found in 
totalitarian regimes, which blur or erase the 
line between politics and crime. Any opposi-
tional politics is defined as crime. But they also 
contrast with the creation of the first modern 
police department in Paris at the end of the 
seventeenth century in which the protection of 
public order was also equated with the protec-
tion of the political order. Indeed, for many ob-
servers the connection has been reversed. That 
is, protecting the right to protest against the 
political order is defined as the best way of pro-
tecting it—at least if the political order is 
broadly defined to involve a set of democratic 
principles, rather than the particular persons 
or groups in power. The conditions under 
which democracies can accept nonelectoral po-
litical challenges and yet remain democracies 
is an issue of enduring importance. As James 
Madison observed, “you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the 
next place, oblige it to control itself.”
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